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Introduction 
This paper aims to analyse the evolution of the relationship between the German radical left and the anti-
imperialist struggles. The period covered start at the end of World War II (WWII), thus, focusing the analysis 
on the dynamics of German anti-imperialism after 1945 and its specificities. If one consider the issue of anti-
imperialism in the industrial countries, the question is how the German radical Left evolved from its central 
place in the anti-imperialist solidarity in Europe to one of the weakest Left? According to our thesis, a pos-
sible reason is that the concept of “fascistisation” (Faschisierung) did, progressively, become a reference 
point concerning anti-imperialism, linking this question to a wider critic of West-German modern democra-
cy. 
A global overview of the evolution of anti-imperialism in the German left will be given. It will start from one 
of its main catalyst: the Algerian revolution. Even if German colonialism was almost overshadowed by the 
National-Socialist Period (hiding the genocide of the Hereros for example) and we will conclude by todays 
situation of Die Linke. As we will show, to support the Algerian revolution was a first step in the evolution of 
German anti-imperialism who became stronger during the protest against the Vietnam War. In this context 
based on a new political concept, the Faschisierung and the different analysis of fascism became central in 
the critic of both imperialism and the West-German society. But, in the 70’s, Israel began to be a structural 
element of the anti-imperialist mobilisations. In the 90’s one of the biggest “political split” in the German 
Left since 1945, took place between the Antideutsch (antigerman) and the Anti-imps (anti-imperialists) 
movements. 
 
I. 
The Algerian Revolution consequences were quite different for Germany than they were for France. Germany 
did not fear the loss of its colonies and its interests were not at stakes. So, it is clear that the German rela-
tionship to the Algerian Revolution never was the core of Germany’s foreign policy. When, on November 1st 
1954, the Algerian National Liberation Front (F.L.N) began to revolt, the German Left was not divided by 
whether or not it had to support this Liberation Struggle. It clearly was not a priority. In his book Internatio-
nalismus, Josef Hierlmeier wrote that “The Internationalism of the workers movements has stopped to exist 
after the National-Socialist Period1” and that just a few people engage themselves in solidarity with the Alge-
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rian resistance. According to Hierlmeier, it is with the Student Movement of the 60’s that Internationalism 
began to have theoretical relevance again. If Hierlmeier is right to point out the Student Movement as a key 
moment in International Solidarity, the fact that his book begins with the Vietnam War did not grasp the 
political roots of the Vietnam solidarity which have grown from the solidarity with the Algerian Revolution. 
We will focus on the role played by organisations – especially the S.P.D – because it shows the evolution of 
the balance of forces in Germany concerning anti-imperialism. What is relevant to our analysis is that, by 
supporting the Algerian Revolution, the S.P.D lined its critic of colonialism to a critic of West-Germany. 
Thus, the German S.P.D had nothing to do with the French S.F.I.O. 
After WWII, French socialists widely supported Colonialism, as Ian Birchall pointed out: 
One of the most appalling aspect of the Algerian war, was the way in which the main traditional or-
ganisations of the working class abandoned any pretensions to internationalism. It was Guy Mollet, 
leader of the S.F.I.O, who was responsible for the escalation of the war in 1956, while the P.C.F, ai-
ming to revive a “Popular Front”, backed Mollet's introduction of “special powers”.2 
In France, the so called “Algerian policy” was widely lead by socialists1. As Jacques Jurquet – former mem-
ber of the P.C.F who became later a figure of french Maoism – wrote in his book Années de feu, the French 
socialists were also responsible for the colonial repression, following WWII, in Algeria and a large part of the 
french radical left was completely unable to have an efficient anti-colonial policy. In Germany, the situation 
was quite different, as Germany was occupied by the allies, every single “German policy question” turned 
quickly also as a question of “international policy”. According to Thomas Scheffler, who wrote a book about 
the S.P.D and the Algerian war, the situation of Germany after WWII may explain why it was easier for the 
German left, at least theoretically, to support anti-colonial struggles in Africa and Asia than for many Euro-
pean social-democratic or communist parties. But, in Germany, the Social-Democratic Solidarity with the 
Algerian Struggle did not explode with the beginning of the fights in 1954. Actually in its “policy statements”3 
from 1951, the word “Kolonialismus” did not even appear once. From 1954 to 1956, the Solidarity with the 
Algerian people, from the S.P.D, was mainly the fact of a few trotskysts4.  But, the support of the Algerian 
Revolution, coming from German organisations, really began in 1956/57, when the F.L.N exported its politi-
cal strategy to Europe. 
While the first representative of the F.L.N in the French Metropolis was Mourad Terbouche (former member 
of the Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratiques – M.T.L.D), who was arrested in 1955, the 
French federation of the F.L.N was reorganised in 1957 by Mohamed Lebdjaoui. Thus in 1957 the French 
federation of the F.L.N really had become an integral part of the political strategy of the F.L.N. The French 
federation of the F.L.N began to organize a wide solidarity network across different countries in Europe. But, 
in our opinion, a European network did not exist at all since there was no real relations between the different 
groups of each country. 
Concerning Germany, as the chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, was an ally of France, his government did not 
help Algerians to come to Germany. According to Kader Benamara and Fritz Keller in 1958 (when De Gaulle 
                                                             
2 Ian Birchall, “Mitterrand's war”, In : Ian Birchall (ed.), European Revolutionaries and Algerian independence : 1954 
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1 Ex. : From 1944 to 1951, all the “gouverneur général” (General Governor) in Algeria were socialists (Yves 
Chataigneau and Marcel-Edmond Naegelen), from 1944 to 1950, the Ministers of Home Affairs were also socialists. 
3 See : “Ziele und Aufgaben des demokratischen Sozialismus : Erklärung der Sozialistischen Internationale, 
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4 Especially from Georg Jungclass, member of the K.P.D in his youth who took part to the fight against nazism, and 
Jakob Moneta – who went to Palestine during the Nazi Period, became anti-zionist, and, after coming back to Europe, 
took a place at the German Embassy in Paris in 1954, at the beginning of the Algerian Revolution. His diplomacy 
position enabled him to take a large part in the support of the Algerian cause alongside other members of the IV. 
International like Ernest Mandel and Sal Santen. Several years later, he published his famous book about the french 
CP : Die Kolonialpolitik der französischen K.P. 
 
came back at the head of the country), 2000 to 3000 Algerian lived in West-Germany and had huge issues to 
live decently. In West-Germany, big demonstrations were organized in solidarity with the Algerian people. A 
lot of organizations took part in the solidarity movement, but the S.P.D really was the most important of 
them. 
The evolution of the S.P.D concerning the colonial question should be analysed in its relationship to its stu-
dent movement, the S.D.S. Indeed, the party and its student organisations had pretty tense relations. The 
S.D.S wanted to transform the solidarity with the Algerian Revolution in a main Theme in West-Germany 
through the Link between Colonialism and German policy, this was especially the case of Georg Jungclass, 
one of the main figures of the German S.D.S. So, if it is true to say that the S.P.D was a leader of the solidarity 
with Algeria, it was mainly through its youth and student organisations. 
The Solidarity of the Student Movement took two forms: propaganda in order to bring back the German Sol-
diers from the ”Légion étrangère” (one of the main forces fighting against the F.L.N) and  anti-war mobiliza-
tions who was not just against the French army in Algeria but also against the German rearmament. With the 
Algerian Revolution the Student Movement became more and more autonomous and independent of the 
German Social–Democracy. The final fracture between the Student Movement and the S.P.D occurred in 
1959, during the Bad-Godesberg Congress were the S.P.D assumed its reformist, non-marxist and anti-
communist turn. Of course, the Bad-Godesberg Program assumed a new way of thinking international soli-
darity. The internationalist tradition was abandoned and the “Entwicklungspolitik” (development policy) 
was promoted. The political aspect of the solidarity with the Algerian Revolution was abandoned and the 
S.P.D became a kind of promoter of humanitarianism. The international political solidarity became the fact 
of the student organisations who played a crucial role in the next steps of anti-imperialist struggles in Ger-
many. 
 
II 
 
This brings us to our second point, which is the emergence of a wide anti-imperialist mass movement in 
Germany led by the student movement in the form of the SDS. Of course, this kind of anti-imperialism not 
only appeared in Germany, but the German specificity was to point out the continuity between German fas-
cism and the Federal Republic. Thus, the concept of “Fascism” became central for a wide array of left-wing 
political analysis, something that naturally included a critique of US imperialism. The thesis of fascistisation 
(Faschisierung) of West Germany arose with the protest movement against the introduction of the “state 
emergency laws” in the German Grundgesetz (basic law) in 1968. The laws permitted the German state to 
restrict civil liberties in case of war or insurrection. However, the idea of Faschisierung quickly began to be 
applied to international questions. In his 1965 Essay “Repressive Tolerance” (part of A Critique of Pure Tole-
rance), Marcuse developed the idea that “what is proclaimed and practiced as tolerance today, is in many of 
its most effective manifestations serving the cause of oppression5”. Marcuse was not limiting his critique to 
Germany but extended it to US-imperialism after the latter´s growing involvement in Vietnam. In a letter to 
Horkheimer, written in June 1967, Marcuse wrote that he saw in the US, the historical successor of Fascism: 
“The fact that concentration camps, dead people and torture are outside of the Metropolis did not change 
reality in any way. What is happening in Vietnam are war crimes and crimes against humanity”. However, it 
was Adorno, who also formulated a critique of the war in Vietnam by implying a continuity with Auschwitz.  
Hence, the assumption of a continuity between fascism and democracy in industrialized countries was ins-
                                                             
5 Herbert Marcuse, “Repressive Tolerance”, 
http://www.marcuse.org/herbert/pubs/60spubs/65repressivetolerance.htm 
trumental in generating anti-imperialist solidarity among the German radical left with a number of struggles. 
As Matthias Dapprich wrote in his 2013 PhD about the historical development of West Germany's new left: 
During the '1968 years', student activists frequently incorporated resistance movements and their 
protagonists in foreign countries into their ideals, involving almost unconditional partisanship in fa-
vour of resistance forces all over the world, most notably, the Vietcong in South Vietnam, Ho Chi 
Minh, the leader of the Vietnamese Democratic Republic and Che Guevara.6 
 
The influence of the Frankfurt School in creating a specific form of German anti-imperialism stands in sharp 
contrast to an assumption widely shared today, even among authors on the German left. Namely, that the 
degeneration of the German student movement began when it moved away from Critical Theory and embra-
ced an orientation towards the working class, often in the form of a “vulgar” Maoism. In fact, the reasons for 
Critical Theory´s declining influence within the student movement did not lie in its political orientation but 
its inability to strategically relate to an upsurge of working class struggles that was gripping Europe, and to a 
lesser extent the Federal Republic, in the form of a series of wildcat strikes in 1969. 
After the SDS disbanded in 1970, its many currents took the form of many successor organizations, mostly 
Maoist, but also orthodox-communist, workerist and to a lesser extent, Trotskyist. The relative social peace 
prevalent in Germany, the entanglement of the “German Question” with global geopolitics, and the isolation 
of the radical left from society gave the issue of struggles in the periphery a key role in defining political iden-
tities and paradigms. The most obvious manifestation of this was the attraction emanating from groups like 
the Red Army Faction (RAF) and the Revolutionary Cells (RZ), whose cooperation with radical Palestinian 
faction is well documented today. Solidarity was articulated primarily out of a programmatic basis. That is to 
say that the struggles supported most strongly were the ones lead by organizations deemed ideologically 
close to the positions of the respective German organizations. 
Maoism proved the main benefactor of the wave of 1968. The best example of the influence of Critical Theory 
among the 1970s Marxist left was the Kommunistische Bund (KB), a “soft Maoist” splinter party that elevated 
the “theory of fascistisation of state and society” to its main theoretical cannon. According to this view, the 
Federal Republic and its elites were on a slippery slope towards fascism, and were aided in this by Social 
Democracy. The implication that society was also becoming fascist implicitly created a contradiction between 
an orientation towards the working class on the one hand, and the anti-imperialist solidarity that was percei-
ved as one of the weapons needed to counter the tendency of fascistisation on the other. For the entire radical 
left, this solidarity entailed supporting the struggle against Apartheid, against the Chilean coup, as well as the 
Palestinian struggle. The KB´s example is just one of the many manifestations of the importance of anti-
imperialism in defining the German left´s political identity, amidst an apolitical and often hostile environ-
ment. 
 
III. 
But like its counterparts elsewhere, the German radical left began declining around the mid-1970s. The fact 
that periphery-oriented Maoism was more influential in Germany meant that there were more leftists disillu-
sioned by the course of Mao´s successors, but also by the revelations about the character of the Pol Pot re-
gime in Cambodia. This mass of now former Maoists often moved to the new Green party and the radical 
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with  particular emphasis on the Marxistische Gruppe and Maoist K-Gruppen, PhD Thesis (unpublished), 
University of Glasgow, 2013, p. 45 
environmental movement that was beginning to gain traction around the end of the decade. One of the defi-
ning features of this transformation involved the replacement of political paradigms by a moralistic outlook, 
as well as the replacement of anti-imperialism with outlooks promoting development aid. Meanwhile, the 
massive peace movement was largely hostile to anti-imperialist theory and was mostly characterized by a 
moralistic pacifism. 
 
Anti-imperialism in the 1980s was mostly confined to the growing autonomous movement that engaged in 
squats and battles with the police. However, the overall decline of the radical left meant that there was little 
theoretical development on the concept of anti-imperialism. The real turning point came during the end of 
the decade with the simultaneously occurring events of German reunification, the first Palestinian Intifada 
and the second Gulf War against Iraq. The KB took its theory of fascistisation a step further. The group split 
following disagreements over German reunification. While a wing joined the refounded Eastern communist 
party PDS, another declared the abstract notion of “Germany” as a nation as the main enemy for the left. It 
was this wing that eventually coined the term Antideutsch, or “anti-German”, which is today associated with 
a pro-Zionist outlook towards the Middle East combined with some form of leftist self-identification. Against 
this background or resurgent German nationalism, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ebbing of libera-
tion struggles in the periphery, German anti-imperialism collapsed overnight as a current. The fear of a re-
surgent Germany autonomous from its constraints after World War II lead in many instances to left-wing 
support of actions by governments deemed to be counterweights to the new Germany, be it the US attack on 
Iraq, Israel´s clampdown against the Palestinians and even the war fought by Slobodan Milosevic in the Bal-
kans.  However, the projection of German history into the present was not just practiced by subaltern ele-
ments of the radical left, for even the Green foreign minister Joschka Fischer justified the attack in Yugosla-
via in 1999 with the need to “prevent another Auschwitz”. Anti-imperialism and antifascism, so it seemed, 
were no longer complementary but were turned against each other for short-term political gain. 
Nevertheless, tensions within the German radical left really escalated with the advent of the War on Terror 
and the outbreak of the Second Intifada. Amidst the mass movement against the Iraq War, the Antideutsch 
began distancing themselves from the left and accusing anti-imperialists of being anti-Semitic due to their 
opposition to Israeli policies towards the Palestinians. A good example of this trend of ex-leftists are the writ-
ings of Matthias Küntzel, a former KB-member who – without knowledge of Arabic – has written a much-
cited book “proving” the Nazi origins of Arab nationalism and Islamism in Palestine. 
However, these debates from the 1990s and the early 2000s had major consequences for the formulation of 
anti-imperialist positions, even among a great part of the left that does not share the pro-Zionist outlook of 
the Antideutsch. While there can be no talk of a triumph of the Antideutsch, there exists today a more com-
plex debate regarding solidarity with liberation struggles like the Palestinian one. In a way, these disagree-
ments can be seen as a reflection of the debates between Lenin and Luxemburg on the question of Polish 
independence. Therefore, some anti-imperialist liberation struggles are deemed worthy of support because 
they are perceived to be emancipatory, while others are deemed as “regressively nationalist” and in the case 
of the Palestinian struggle “anti-Semitic”, disregarding any objective benefit the positive outcome of these 
struggles might produce, or even the mere fact of oppression that needs to be challenged. 
Nowhere can this contradiction be seen best as in the case of the Kurdish and Palestinian struggles. Whereas 
the bulk of the German radical left, in its Marxist or autonomist tendencies supports the Kurdish fight 
against ISIS unconditionally and often uncritically, a double standard is been applied to the Palestinian 
struggle. The main argument given in defence of this situation is the “progressive character” of the PKK com-
pared to the “reactionary” character of Hamas. The nationalist character of one struggle is thus muted, 
whereas in the other case it is overemphasized. In this, once can find continuities as well as breaks from the 
Third-World-solidarity of the 1970s. While the position on Palestine has in many cases been turned on its 
head, the focus in both cases remains strictly programmatic and oriented towards “ideological purity”. What 
has begun as an application of postwar antifascism on anti-imperialist struggles has in many cases ended 
with the generalization of the German experience of fascism and its “export” to the periphery, something 
undermining anti-imperialist solidarity. 
 
Conclusion 
In this presentation, we tried to outline some contours of a specific tradition of German anti-imperialism. We 
have emphasized the role German history – in the form of the fascist experience as well as the Cold War – 
has played in predicating Third World solidarity among a number of actors, ranging from Social Democracy 
to the radical left. Today, the deepening crisis of the autonomous antifascist movement, the deepening 
economic crisis combined the rise of islamophobic far-right populism in the guise of PEGIDA, resurgent geo-
political rivalries over the Ukraine and Syria, but also the growing strength of the Global BDS solidarity 
movement with Palestine and the growing interactions between movements operating in different national 
spheres, are all developments that challenge previously held assumptions among the German left about the 
“primacy of the ideological” factor. These developments make the growth a new anti-imperialist movement – 
and one that will be guided by the premise of solidarity with the oppressed and not by projections and a quest 
for ideological purity – all the more urgent. 
